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Two majortrends in the world economy areinternationalmigrationandenvi-
￿l degradation. The object ofthe paper is to analyze the connection
"een these two trends, which have generally been analyzed in isolation.
Here we represent a world economy in which the exploitation of natural
resources as well as the migration oflaborhave a global character. We dis-
cuss the welfare impact ofmigration and exploitation ofnatural resources
andpolicies to address theseissues.
Industrial development has reached a point where it adversely affects the
natural environment. A large share ofthe worldpopulation couldbe harmed
by the instability of the global climate caused by increased concentration
ofC02 in the atmosphere. The destruction ofbiodiversity on the planet has
reached unprecedented proportions. Although these are world phenomena,
Chichilnisky (1994) showed that environmental degradation canalso be con-
sideredasaNorth-Southissue. Theinternationalmarket isthe vehiclethrough
which the overproduction ofnaturalresources by the Southis reconciled with
the overconsumptionby the North. At the heart ofthis explanation there is
the crucial role played by the different regimes ofproperty rights prevailing
in the resource extractionofthe two regions.
Another world-wide phenomenon, the migration of labor, has recently
intensified. Large migrant flows from Latin America to the USA and from
NorthAfrica andMiddle Eastto Europe take placetoday. The collapse ofthe
socialist economies in Eastern Europe has led to massive migration into the
industrialized partofEurope.
Not surprisingly, governments and international organizations are con-
cerned with these developments. Migrant labor has profound consequences
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not only on the host countries but also on the countries of origin. Besides
social and political effects, the change in the availability oflabor affects the
employmentstructureandthedistributionofincome ofthecountriesinvolved.
Environmental damage can lead to disruptions of entire populations such as
those caused by scarcity ofwater.
Migration is typically linked to wage and income differentials. Moreover,
there isnow evidence (e.g. Myers, 1993) that migration isparticularly sensi-
tive tothedegradationoftheenvironmentandtotheeffectsofclimate change.
Migrantflowsaretypically fromthe Southto theNorth, sinceclimatechanges
affect moretheprimary sector ofthe economy which isthe basis ofSouthern
economy. In addition developing countries have fewest (technical as well as
economic) resourcesto confronttheproblem. It is alsobelievedthat environ-
mental refugees, as they could aptly be called (Myers, 1993), are the result
oftropical deforestation, soil erosion and desertification that occur in many
areas ofthe South. Chichilnisky (1994) showed how allthesephenomena are
directly connected to trade and to thepoor definition ofproperty rights inthe
South.
Migrationpatterns reallocate productionintheNorthandSoutheconomies,
induce a change intrade patterns, and a modification ofrelative prices.
We develop a framework which follows Chichilnisky (1981, 1994), pos-
sessing the same logical structure as the Heckscher-0hlin model that high-
lights the connection between labor migration and exploitation of natural
resources. From our analysis we obtain answers to the following questions:
1. how does migration affect the exploitationofnatural resources?
2. howdo policies to check environmentaldegradationinteractwith migra-
tion flows?
3. howdo tradepolicies affect migrationflowsandtheexploitation ofnatural
resources?
The main results ofthe paper are as follows. Migration is prompted by
wage differentials as technology is different across countries. We show that
migrationfromthe Southinducesadecreaseintheexploitation oftheresource
intheSouth. This increasesthewelfareoftheSouthbutcandecreasethatofthe
North. Migrationcan leadto higherprices ofresources in theNorthandinthe
South, settingupaprocessofinducedtechnicalchange intheNorth andbetter
terms oftrade for the South, altogether a positive outcome. As is intuitively
obvious, migrationreducesthe wage differential betweenNorth and Southin
amodelwhere, contrary to Heckscher-Ohlinassumptions, technologies differ
between countries. Finally, we show that it is possible that a tax on the use
ofthe resource in the Southinduces an increase inits extractionrather than a
decrease. Tradepolicies couldhaveapositive impact on resource extraction,
could reduce the wage gap andtherefore decreasethe economic incentive to
the mobility oflabour.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 extendsit tocoverthecase ofmigrationandproves the mainresults
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on the effects ofmigrationonthe exploitation ofthe resourceandthewelfare
ofthe South. Section4examinesthe tendency towardsrealwage equalization.
Section 5 argues that tax policies onthe use ofthe resource are unreliable in
that they can have effects opposite fromwhat is intended. Finally, we discuss
how traditional trade policies could affect the degree offactor mobility and
the exploitation ofresources.
Thereare tworegions, the industrialized countries (North) andthedeveloping
countries (South), two goods A and B and two factors. The formulation
follows Chichilnisky (1981, 1994). The inputs are an environmentalresource
E and labor L, that are used to produce the two goods. In both regions the
B good is more resource intensive than A. Constant returns to scale and
fixedcoefficients are assumed in the productionofeach good. Technology is
different in the two countries:' there are four technical coefficients, ci(ai),
representing thequantity oflabor(environmental resource) perunitofoutput
ofgoodi. Endowments oflabor and environmentalresource are notfixedbut
depend on relative rewards. Therefore, even ifthere are fixed coefficients in
.production, there is substitutability amongfactors in theeconomyas awhole
as relative prices change.2
Consider first the economy ofthe South. Perfect competition in the goods
market and constantreturnsto scale imply zero profits in equilibrium so that:
where PA (respectively PB) is the price ofgood A(B), PE(w) is the price
ofthe environmental resource (labor), ai(q) (i = 1, 2) are the coefficients of
the environmentalresource(labor)respectively in industry 1 (B) and 2 (A).
The assumption thatB is more intensive in the useofthe resource than A
translates into a positivevaluefor D = a1 C2 - a2C1 . Forfuture referencewe
derive therelationbetween PB andthewage, w, andPB and PE, theprice of
the resource.














LS _-_ awl PB + Lo,
where /3 and Lo arepositive.
For simplicity, we assume that the resource is extracted using labor as
the only input and according to a strictly concave production function,
E = E(N) . It was shown recently (Chichilnisky, 1994)3 that under these
circumstances the amount ofresource supplied is an increasing function of
theprice oftheresourceandthatthe preciseformofthesupply curve depends
on the prevailing structure ofproperty rights. We will assume that the South
has common property (in particular open access)regimes forthepools from
whichtheresource is extracted.
To solvethemodelwe needto know therelativeprice ofthe resource with
respectto labor. However, thereisno developedlabormarket in theextraction
sector oftheSouththatwe labelthesubsistencesector ofthe economy: hence
there is no market wage. We needto define the opportunity costoflabor. Let
us denote this opportunity costby q and letus assume for the moment thatit
is a given quantity, equal for each worker. Later in the paper we will derive
an expression for q in a general equilibrium fashion.
How is the opportunity cost q connectedwith the level ofresource extrac-
tion? Following Chichilnisky (1994) alevel ofeffort is chosen bythetypical
worker in such a way that q equals the common property marginal product
oflabor times the market price ofthe resource. The commonproperty mar-
ginal product (CMP) is the change in the average yield that atypical worker
i obtains as (s)he supplies one more unit of effort in a situation where the
ownership ofthepool isnotrestricted. We can express the relationthatholds
inthe optimal situation as
PE . CMP=q,
As theprice oftheresourcePE increasestheoptimal level ofeffort increases,
given the assumption ofstrict concavity of the production function and the
constancy of q . As a result the quantity supplied ofthe resource goes up as
its price PE increases.
These considerations give riseto a supply curve ofthenatural resource in
the Souththat depends positively on itspricePE, for any given q . Notehow
property rights matter. Iftherewerewell definedprivatepropertyrights inthe
South, then the supply curve w, equals theprivatepropertymar¬ Thus argument leads us to I (which is assumed to be linear fi
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South, then the supply curve would have been steeper, as in this case q1PE
equals the privatepropertymarginal product which is lowerthan the CMP.4
This argument leads us to postulate a supply function of the resource
(which is assumed to be linear for simplicity):
ES = aPElq +Eo,
￿
(4)
where Eo anda > 0.
The parameter a is large when there is commonproperty fortheresource
(as it is the case with the South) since it reflects the greater sensitivity of
the supply of E to its price in comparison to the case where property rights
are well defined.s In the model a large value for a formalizes the so-called
"tragedy of the commons" which is known to lead to an exploitation ofthe
resourcewhichislarger thantheoneoccurringwith aprivatepropertyregime.
The situation is summarized in the following diagram, where ECS is the
commonproperty supply curve and Ep theprivate property supply curve:
Diagram 1
The demand equations forthe resources, ED and LD, are:
E
where Bs (AS) is the supply ofthe B (A) commodity respectively.
In equilibrium demand forresources equals supply sothat:
(5)
(6)
The South exports the resource intensive good, B and imports A. Indeed
it has been shown (Chichilnisky, 1994) that when the two countries have
identical technology and preferences, a sufficient reason for them to engage
in trade is the difference in theproperty rights regime ofthe natural resource
that is used as an inputofproduction. In particular the Southhas anapparent114 G. Chichilnisky andM. DiMatteo
comparative advantage in, and exports, the resource intensive good. The
Southexportsgood B, even ifNorth and South share similartechnology and
preferences.
In the context ofthe present, more general model, where technologies and
preferences may differ among countries, the assumed pattern of trade can
always be sustained by a suitable choice ofthe value ofthe demand for the
A good in the two countries, as it is apparent from inspection ofdiagram 2
below.
Exports of the South equal the difference between domestic supply and
demand, namely:
XB - s _Bs -B ,
whereas imports ofcommodity Aequal the difference between demand and
domestic supply, namely:
2.2. Two Region Model
Equations fortheNorth are similar except fordifferent values ofthe parame-
ters and ofthe exogenous variables, reflecting different technologies, prefer-
ences and property right regime. In the North it is possible that laborsupply
responds little to the real wage.b Property rights for the resources are well
definedinthe North sothatthe supply curvefortheNorthis steeperreflecting
the privatepropertymarginal product.
InEquation (4)we approximate q, theopportunity costoflabor, byPB for
the South where subsistence labor is employed in the extraction sector. For
the North we approximate q by PA as there is no subsistence sector in the
North. Equation (4) now reads forthe South:
Es =aPEIPB+Eo
and fortheNorth:
Es(N) =aNPEIPA + Eo(N).
The North imports the resource intensive good B and exports the (skilled)
laborintensive good A.
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To close the model we follow the original Chichilnisky's model (1981)8
but we couldequally considerotherassumptionswhichwould leadto similar
results:9
AD(S) = AD(S), (S),
AD(N) = Ao(N).
The model is composed of 12 equations for the South ((1-11) and (17))
plus 12 analogous equations for the North (denoted (1'-11 ') and (18)) plus
(12), (13), (15) and(16). Indeed, Equation (14) is always satisfiedwhentrade
is balanced and (12), (13), and(14) hold. There are 28 endogenous variables,
14 in each region: PB, PA, w, PE, LS, LD, ES, ED, BS, BD, AS, AD, XB,
XDD.1o
Itturns outthatthe model canbe solved analytically in avery simple way:
it reduces to aquadraticequationinthe Southern terms oftrade, PB. Starting
from the equilibrium conditionin theworld market for the A good
Ao(S) + Ao(N) = AS(S) +AS(N)
andusing Equations (1-8) we obtain:
[A(N)] PB + [Ao(S) +Ao(N) + C(S) + C(N)] PB




C(S) = (1/D)[c1Eo - a1Lo +(aja20 + clc2a)/D],
C(N) = (1/D)N[(CIEO - a1Lo)N + (ala20 - Cia)N/DN],
V(S) = ,3ai/D2 +aci/D2,
V(N) = 3N(a'1)N1DN.
Equation (19) has one positivesolution since the constantterm is negative
andthe quadratic is positive.
Once the terms oftrade are known all the other endogenous variables can
be computed (Chichilnisky, 1981). The solution ofthe model is, therefore,
complete.
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XB(S) = XD(N), (14)
XA (S) = XA(N). (15)
Finally, we choose the numeraire:
PA =1. (16)The market for the A good can be illustrated in the following diagram,
wherethecontinuouslineindicatesthe equilibrium level ofthe terms oftrade
at which the Southern demand for exports equals the Northern supply of
exports:
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Diagram 2
2.3. The Opportunity Cost ofLaborin the SubsistenceSector
Typically, the opportunitycostoflabor, q is equal tothewagebut in the South
there is no formal labor market in the subsistence sector. Therefore, in the
following we will derive an endogenous value for q in a general equilibrium
fashion, following (Chichilnisky, 1994).
We assume that the typical worker maximizes a utility function U =
U(A, No - N) depending on the consumption of good A and on leisure,
No - N, subject to the following constraint: PAA = PEE(N), where Ehas
already been defined in Section 2.1, and No is the total available amount of






Previously we have shown(inSection2.1)thatqmust beequalto thevalue
ofthe common property marginal product; since in our North-South model
PA = 1, it followsthat:
So q, which is afunction ofPE/PA, is the ratio ofthemarginal utilities of
the typical worker. This fully defines an endogenous value for q, once PB is
known. From the latter we can compute PE usingEquations (1) and (2).
The next step is to show that as the price of the resource which the typ-
ical worker sells goes down, (s)he has to work more and not less to secure
a minimum level of.subsistence when the price of consumption goods has
increased (inrelative terms). Henceournextstepis toascertainwhathappens
to the worker's choice ofleisure andgood Awhen (s)he is confrontedwith a
different priceofthe resource and we allowthe opportunity cost q to change.
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For this purpose only, we assume that the utility function Uhas an elasticity
ofsubstitution betweenleisureand A less than one.i1 In this case anincrease
intherelativeprice ofAimpliesareductionintheleisure consumedor, which
is the same thing, an increase in the supply ofeffort. Hencewe establish:
PROPOSITION 1. Ifthe elasticity ofsubstitution between leisure and con-
sumption is less than one, a worker in thesubsistencesector who maximizes
U = U(A, No - N) subject to PAA = PEE(N), increases his (her) effort
when theprice ofresource Edecreases vis-d-vis theprice ofgoodA.
Proof . The supply curve ES we derived (Equation (4)) wasparameterized
by q. As PEIPA decreases, the quantity ofeffort increases and with it the
supply ofthe resource. By the strict concavity ofthe production function,
also (8E/aN) decreases so that q has to decrease as well. In terms ofour
supply curve forthe resource this means that such a curve shifts downwards
signalling in equilibriumahigher supply oftheresourceas PEIPA decreases,
oncechanges in q are taken into account.
￿
0
Ageometricalexplanationofthe result is provided in the Appendix.
3. Why Does Labor Migrate?
Since technologies are different across countries factor prices are not equal-
izedaftertrade, as theHeckscher-0hlintheory (which isbasedontheassump-
tion ofequaltechnologies)asserts. 12 Indeed realwages areequalacross coun-
tries only when the terms oftrade take on a particular value, PB, given by
the following expression:





The valuein this expression depends exclusivelyontechnologicalparame-
ters so that onlyby a coincidencedoes itequal the equilibriumterms oftrade
that reflects the solution ofthe general equilibrium model. In addition the
value ofthe terms oftrade givenby (20) could be such as to entail anegative
value forthe equalizedreal wage.
Asimilar argument applies fortheprice ofthe resource, which in general
is not equalized either. We can show that to have an equalized price for the
resource E, the terms of trade should take on a value, PB, given by the
following expression:
(c1ID)N - c1/D -
￿




While in equilibrium either (20) or (21) could occurby coincidence, both
cannot occur at the same time, as it is clear by comparing them: hence118 G. Chichilnisky andM. Di Matteo
simultaneous equalization ofreal wages and resource price across countries
is ruled out.
Ifreal wages are differentacross countriesthere isanincentiveforworkers
tomovefromthe lowwagetothehigh wageregion.13 Wecan easily establish
underwhich conditions labor moves to theNorth (South). As every endoge-
nous variable can be computed when the terms oftrade are determined, we
knowthat w/PB < (>)(WIPB)N implies:
[
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Let us makethe following by now standard
14
ASSUMPTION l. In the South technologies aredual.
By dual technologies in the South we mean that theBsector is much more
resource intensive than in theNorth. Thiscanbetranslated into the model by
assuming a much larger valueforD with respectto DN (see thedefinition of
D in Section 2.1). Ifthen D » DN then we can establish that labor leaves
theSouth whenever






In a similar way we can establish (under the same conditions) that the price
oftheresource is lower in the South than in the Northwhenever




In addition to the realwagegap, otherfactorshaverecently beenhighlighted
in the migration phenomenon. In particular there is evidence (Myers, 1993)
thatamong the consequences ofenvironmental damage isthefactthatpeople
move away from theirhomes. It is also believed that environmentalrefugees
aredue to tropical deforestation, soil erosion and desertification.
It is becausemigration is such a complex phenomenon that at first we do
not intend to establish a strict, quantitative relation between the number of
workers whomigrateandtherealwages gap inthe two countries. Thoughwe
maintainthat, amongeconomic factors, realwagesdifferential is amajorforce
in shaping labor migration, at this stage our analysis can accommodate the
casewhere (at leastpartof) migration occurs forenvironmental motivations.
In order to accommodate the analysis ofmigration in our framework we
simply reinterpretthe equilibrium describedinthemodeloftheprevious sec-
tionas an equilibriumoccurring inaninterval oftime within whichmigration
isnotallowed. 15 Atthe endofeachperiod workers checkwhetherreal wages
are higher in the North than in the South and decide to move towards the
higher wage country.
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Thenumberofworkerswhoatthejunctionbetweenoneperiod andanother
leave any one country can be represented in the model as a change in Lo. If
workers leave the South(North) it willbea fall (increase)inLo forthe South
andanincrease (fall) ofLo(N) in theNorthofexactlythesameamount.Then
a new equilibriumis reachedwithin thesecond period attheendofwhichthe
storyrepeats itself.
4. The Effects ofMigration on Wage Differential and Resource
Extraction
Let us now suppose, quite reasonably, thatreal wages are lower in the South
than in the North so that workers move from the South to the North. In our
modelthis is capturedby an increase in Lo(N) and a fall in Lo ofexactlythe
samemagnitude.
We can now establishthe following
PROPOSITION 2. IfAssumption 1 holds, migrationfrom the South to the
North is associated with a higher leveloftheSouth's terms oftrade.












2PB [A(N)] + [AD(S) (S) +A'(N) +C(S) +C(N)]
8PB
In the denominator when a is large in the South the sign of the term in a
determinesthe sign ofC(S) and C(N). Sincetheterm in a in C(S) is clc2a,
a positive quantity, the denominator is positive in this case. IfAssumption 1
holds, thenthenumeratorofthe second expression is larger in absolute value
than the numerator of the first and the net effect will be dominated by the
Northern component. As a consequence ofthe assumed changes in Lo, the
change in the terms oftrade will bepositive.
￿
o
The intuitive economic explanation of the above result is as follows. An
increase inLo(N) and a fall in Lo(S) means thatforanylevel ofthe termsof
tradethe supply oflaboris larger in theNorth andsmaller in the South. This
triggers a shift in the production mix in each country, the North increasing
the production of A (at the expense ofB), the South the production ofthe
resource intensive good B (atthe expense ofA). Take the market for the A
good: ifthe fall in productionin the Southis smallerthan the increase in the
North, then the terms oftrade ofthe South increase. This happens precisely120 G. Chichilnisky andM. DiMatteo
when, accordingto ourterminology, technologies are dualin the South(using
Equations (5-8)):












Thesituation is illustrated inthediagrambelow where PB is the newlevel
ofthe terms oftrade and A's is the level ofsupply ofAaftermigration.
Diagram 3
Toproceedwith our analysis weneedto determine whetherthe wagedif-
ferential decreases after migration. When workers leave the South the terms
oftrade are lowerthan the level at which real wages are equalized. Since as
a consequence ofmigration flows, theterms oftrade increase, it is clearthat
the gap,in the terms oftrade will be lower:
PROPOSITION3. AnnAssumption 1 holds, migrationwillreduce thewage
differential.
Proof. When Assumption 1 holds, workers leave the South whenever
PB < PB. As a consequence of migration from the South terms oftrade
increase. Ergo the gap in the terms oftrade reduces. On the otherhand, from
the comparison of Equations (1) and (2) with the corresponding Northern
equations, an increase in the terms oftrade will induce a fall in the Southern
real wage which is less than the fall in the Northern, ifAssumption 1 holds.
Therefore, there is a tendency towards wage rates equalization. A similar
argument holds when real wages are higher in the South than in the North,
namelywhen PB > PB.
￿
o
The situation16 is illustrated in diagram 4 where the different slopes ofthe
two curves depends on Assumption 1, namely on the large value ofD with
respectto DN:
The nextpointis to exf
wish to determine whether
The outcome depends c
has takenplace. We have e
terms oftraderise. Thisin
and (2). Inparticularthep
than in the South, ifAssu
prices between the North
ofthe resource were lowe
result in reducing the diffe
equilibrium terms oftrade
PB < PB, then labor migi
the resource prices gaps.17
From the policy point c
priceofthe resource across
from the North to exploit 1
secondly it could setup a F
These developments are nc





level forthe price ofthe re:
laboremployed inthesubsi
quantity supplied ofthe re,
can be inferred bymaking 1
It was shown there that a:
worker in the subsistence
of the resource will be ex
increase and, as is clearfro
increases as well, it follow,sare dualinthe South(using





rmine whetherthe wage dif-
.rs leave the South the terms
ages are equalized. Since as
rade increase, it is clear that
:gration will reduce thewage
leave the South whenever
>m the South terms of trade
ces. Ontheother hand, from
the corresponding Northern
induce a fall in the Southern
Zern, ifAssumption 1 holds.
ates equalization. A similar
the South than in the North,
0
e the different slopes ofthe
)n the large value ofD with
WIPB
Trade, Migration andEnvironment 121
Diagram4
The next point is to explore the impact ofmigration on the resources. We
wish to determine whetherdifferencesinPE across countries increase.
The outcome depends on the sign ofthe differential gap before migration
has taken place. We have establishedthat aftermigration from the South, the
terms oftraderise. This in turnwill increase PE as is clearfromEquations (1)
and (2). Inparticularthepriceofthe resourcewill increase more inthe North
than in the South, ifAssumption 1 holds, thus increasing the difference in
prices between the North and the South. Only ifbefore migration the price
ofthe resource were lower in the North than in the South, would migration
result in reducing the differential in theresource price. In otherwords, ifthe
equilibrium terms oftrade are such that at the same time PB < PB and
PB < PB, then labormigration will induce areductioninboth the laborand
the resource prices gaps.17
From the policy point ofview the effects ofa yawning gap between the
price oftheresourceacross regions couldbe to foster more direct investment
from the North to exploit the lower level ofthe resourceprice in the South;
secondly it could setup aprocess ofinduced technicalprogressintheNorth.
These developments are notdealtwith here and deserve further analysis.
The final pointin this section is to examine the effects ofmigration on the
exploitationofresources. What willbethe general equilibriumeffects ofthe
migrationpattern?
When migration takes place from South to North a new equilibrium is
establishedwith ahigher leveloftheterms oftrade. Inturnthis implies anew
level fortheprice ofthe resource and a newvalue forthe opportunitycost of
laboremployed inthesubsistencesector to extractthe resource.Asaresult the
quantity supplied ofthe resource will change. In which direction it changes
canbe inferred by makinguse ofa result already established(Proposition 1).
It was shown there that as the price of the resource increases, the typical
worker in the subsistence sector will supply less effort and therefore less
of the resource will be extracted. Since after migration the terms of trade
increase and, as is clear from Equations (1) and (2), the price ofthe resource
increases as well, it follows:122 G. Chichilnisky andM. DiMatteo
PROPOSITION 4. After migrationfrom the South to the North, ifAssump-
tion 1 holds, the new equilibrium is characterized by a higher level ofthe
resourceprice and a yawninggap in resourcesprices in the North and the
South, potentially leading to induced technical change in the North. Ifthe
elasticity ofsubstitution between leisure and the consumption good is less
than onefor the subsistence worker, this leads to a higher opportunity cost
ofsubsistence labor in the South. Atthis new equilibrium the worker applies
less effort and less resourceis extractedin the South.
Proof . This is a corollary of Propositions 1 and 2. From Proposition 2
migration fromthe Southwillincrease theterms oftrade. From Equations (1)
and (2) theincrease intheterms oftradewill increase thepriceoftheresource
(relative to PA). This, via Proposition 1, induces an increase in leisure and,




5. The Effects ofMigration on Welfare
We finally considerthe effects onthewelfare ofthe two countries. Since the
quantity consumed ofthe Agood is givenineach country, one has to look at
the response ofthe demand for the B good (when terms oftrade change) to
analyze welfare improvements. Indeed if, following migration, the demand
for basic goods increases in the South, then South's welfare increases. To
show this, first we recall that exports are the difference between domestic
supply and demand. Secondly, we notice that the supply ofB depends pos-
itively on its price, PB. Ifwe can show that exports fall when the terms of
trade increase,then itis clearthatdemand has to increase.
PROPOSITION 5. Migration oflaborfrom theSouth to the North increases






using (5) and (6) and Walras' Law, we get
This reduces to
XB = (c2E - a2L)/D - (PEE + wL -Ao)IPB.
XB = acIC2/D2PB - aci/D2PB + Ps
1
x [Eocl/D - Loaf/D +AD -,Qai/D2PB + 0ala2/D2].
Ifwe differentiate with respectto PB weget
aXB/aPB = (a/D2PB)[-clc2 + 2c1PBI] - PB2
x [AD +Eocl/D - Loal/D + Qala2/D2 -,3a2
/D2PB].
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. ,3aia2/D2 - ,3a2ID2I'B].
The sign ofthe expression is dominated by the terms in a which is very
large forthe South. From Equations (1) and (2) it is immediate to see thatthe
signofthe term in square brackets is negativeifc2/D < 2PE/PB. The latter
is satisfied when Assumption 1 holds, namely Dis very large. On the other
hand,
8BS/8PB = [aclc2/D2 +,Qala2/D2]PB2 > 0.
Therefore, whenthe terms oftrade increase, supply ofBgoods increasesand
exports decrease: hence demand for B, being the difference ofthe two, has
to increase andthe welfare ofthe Southincreases as well.
Withoutmoreinformation itis impossible todeterminethesignofthe demand
for basics in the North, as there a is not large. We conclude that as workers
move from the South to the North, South's welfare increases and North's
can either decrease or increase, if we measure welfare by the amount of
consumption goods available ineach economy.
To end this section we stress thatdual technology in the South is a crucial
assumption for some ofourresults. Ifthe hypothesis were true for theNorth
(an unlikely event, though) migration from the South would bring about a
decrease in the terms of trade rather than an increase. Consequently, when
laborleaves the Southresourceextractionwould expand rather thancontract.
However, theconclusions aboutthetendency towards areduction ofthewage
(and resourceprice) gap wouldbe unaffected.
6. Effects ofTax andTrade Policies
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In this section we examine the effects ofa tax policy in the South aimed at
reducing the exploitation oftheresource andofachange inthepropertyrights
inthe South. We will also considerthe effects oftrade policy in the South.
It is generally believed that taxes on the use ofthe resource will lead to
a reduction in demand and therefore will help environmental preservation.
However typically this kind ofanalysis assumes that all other prices remain
constant. Herewe would like to examine the effect ofa tax onthe use ofthe
resource inthe general equilibrium model we have justpresented.
Let us assume that a unit tax Ton the use ofthe resource (paid by those
who utilize it) is levied in the South. Assume also thatthe revenuefrom this
tax is used to increase the domestic demand for the non-resource intensive
good, A. Inthis casewe establish:
PROPOSITION 6. A unittax Ton the use ofthe resource, whoseproceeds
are used to increase demandfor the A commodity, will reduce the terms of
trade, thepriceoftheresource, andincreasethe output oftheresource in the
South.124 G. Chichilnisky andM. DiMatteo
Proof . Levying a unit tax on the use of the resource and allocating the
revenue to the demand for good A is tantamount to assuming a shift of
demand in favor ofgood A. By usingthe implicit function theorem and (24),
let us compute:
The above expression is negative since the denominator is positive as in
(25). The decrease in the terms oftrade induces a lowerlevel oftheresource
price, via Equations (1) and (2), an increase in the output oftheresourceand
a fall inthe opportunity cost ofsubsistence labor via Proposition 1.
￿
o
We have shownthatpartial equilibriumresult couldbemisleading since after
the tax the price ofthe resource actually falls rather than increases and this
leads to more extraction,notless. Ifthe above policy were enacted whenreal
wages were lower in the South, one further effect ofthis policy would be
that ofencouraging migration from the South as it widens the wage gap and
induces more degradation.
Can one resort to some other policy to reduce the exploitation of the
resource? An alternative policy in the South would be to define property
rights in a better way so that the extraction of the resource is less sensitive
to its price andthe tendency to an overexploitation ofthe resource is kept in
check (see Chichilnisky, 1994).
Finally, wediscusstheeffectsoftradepolicy,inreferencetoresultsderived
in a context of a similar model. Di Matteo (1993) proved that an export
duty in the South increases its terms oftrade. 18 Therefore, a move towards
protectionism by increasing the terms oftrade and the price ofthe resource
will reduce the amount ofresource produced and exported in the South.
In addition, Di Matteo (1993) proved that a tax on the production ofthe
B good in the South increases its terms oftrade and therefore, as a result,
exploitation oftheresourcefalls.
As a result ofthese policy actions, the real wage differential is reduced







2PB [A(N)] -f. Ao(S) + Ao(N) + C(S) + C(N)
Wehave analyzed the relations between degradation ofthe environmentand
labor migration, two phenomenawhichare atthe centre oftoday's economic
debate. In the South, contrary to the North, property rights in the extraction
sector are notwell defined. The South exportstheresourceintensivegood.
Migrationoccurs duetowagedifferentials. Underourconditions migration
leads to better terns oftrade forthe South, the price ofthe resource goes up
andless resourceis extracted inthe South: the welfare in the South increases.
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Under ourhypotheses migration from the Southto the North helps reducing
the extraction ofthe natural resources.
We also analyze the effect ofa unit tax on the resource in the South with
the revenue spent by the government in buying the less resource intensive
good. This reduces the terms oftrade and therefore increases the extraction
of the resource. Our conclusion is that partial equilibrium analysis oftaxes
can be misleading in that the overall effects ofthe imposition of a tax are
opposite fromwhat is intended.
Finally, wenotice that alessliberal trade policy has positive effects onthe
level ofactual exploitation ofthe resource.
8. Appendix
To showthat as theprice ofthe resource fallsrelative to PA the typicalworker
will supply more effort asweclaimedattheendofSection2, wefirstexamine
the implicationofsuch achange inthe caseofautility function with aunitary
elasticity ofsubstitution. There are two goods, A and leisure, No - N. The
definition ofunitary elasticity ofsubstitution is:
namely
9(A/No - N) PAlq
a(PA1q)
￿
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In words the ratio betweenthe proportionaterateofchange ofthe demand
ratio andthe proportionaterate ofchange ofthemarginal rate ofsubstitution




In the diagram wepostulate an increase in PA, i.e. a move from D to G:
we know (using Thales's theorem) thatinthis case:126 G. Chichilnisky andM . Di Matteo
However, the left-hand side of(28) is the proportionate rate ofchange of
the demand ratio and the right-hand side is the proportionate rate ofchange
ofthe price ratio, when the elasticity ofsubstitution is equal to one. In this
situation the worker will consume the same amount ofleisure and a smaller
amountoftheAgood but in such a waythattheproportion invalue terms of
the goods is unaltered afterthe increase in theprice ofA.
If, on the contrary, the elasticity is less than 1 then forthe left-hand sideto
be less than theright-hand side, it is necessarythat the amount ofA chosen,
say OZ, is greater than the amount chosen in the case ofunitary elasticity,
i.e. OC. This means thatatthe newtangency point the amountofleisurewill
be to theleft ofOB, sayOV: this entails ahigher level ofA consumed anda





Herewedeal with theinterdependence betweenmigrationandenvironmental degradation,
whereas in (Chichilnisky, 1994) the focus was on howdifferences solely in the property
rights regime in the extraction of the resource could lead to an overexploitation of the
resource in the South.
2.
￿
Capital is not explicitly included among the factors of producton. However, one can
consider that labour is skilledandembodies acertain degree oftraining anduseofcapital.
Such training could have been acquired by workingwith machines.
3.
￿
Thereader is referred to (Chichilnisky, 1994,appendix A) foradetailed proof.
4.
￿
The latter equals the average product when thenumber of workers is very large, as it is
sensible to assume in the South. In this case it is immediate to notice that for a strictly
concave production faction the averageproduct is greater than themarginal. For a more
general argument, see(Chichilnisky, 1994, appendix A).
5.
￿
See(Chichilnisky, 1994, section 3).
6.
￿
Avery low valuefor,3 does notaffect results.
7.
￿
Following(Chichilnisky, 1994, appendix B).
8.
￿




The assumption about demand is not in contrast with thehypothesis (asexpressed at the
end ofthis section) about the behaviour ofthe subsistence workers in the South, as the
latter arenotpart oftherest ofthemarket economy.
10. Thelast twofortheNorth are XB andXA.
11 . In the case of a developing country the assumption can be justified on the following
grounds. Supposeon thecontrary, and take an extreme case, that thegood A and leisure
were perfect substitutes. Theworker would be indifferent betweenconsuming no A and
enjoying leisure only: in a situation wherethe typical worker has only labour to sell this
implication is totally unrealistic. On the otherhand, to suppose that A and leisure were
perfect complements would go too far, as it implies that, no matter what prices are, the
typicalworker will consumeagiven;proportion betweenAandleisure(inphysical terms).
Thecase weareconsidering takesinto accountthefact that as thepriceoftheresource the
typical worker sells go down, (s)he has to work more andnot less to secure a minimum
level ofsubsistence whosepricehas gone up (in relative terms).
12. We have analyzed the effects of labour and capital migration and its relation with H-0
modelin (Chichilnisky andDi Matteo, 1992).
13. Probably migration flows re
wages. We maintain however
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iigration and its relation with H-0
13. Probably migration flows respond to differences in real income per capita rather real
wages. We maintain however the classical assumption used in tradetheory as the other
would greatly complicate theanalysis.
14. See, e.g. therecent analysis by BarbaNavaretti (1994).
15. Thereason whymigrationoccurs at discrete intervalsoftime is that to migrateis generally
costly andthedecision requires some time.
16. As we argued (Chichilnisky and Di Matteo, 1992), in general we do not possess enough
empirical information to know whetherwhen the terms of trade equal P B theequalized
real wage is negative: in this case areal wages gapcouldpersisteven aftermigration.
17. This outcomeis in accord with a recent result (Chichilnisky andDi Matteo, 1992) where
in amodel with labour andcapitalwe showed that forsome values oftheterms oftrade it
is possible that as one factor movesthereward differential fortheotherfactor widens. In
other words, we identified an interval forthe terms oftrade with the property that when
equilibrium terms oftrade belong to that interval the movement ofone factor reduces its
ownpricedifferential but increases thepricedifferential of the other factor.
18. It has to be stressed that in (Di Matteo, 1993) Lerner's theorem does not hold. Also the
reaction oftheothercountry aftertheintroduction of thetariffis notconsidered as it calls
fordifferent instruments ofanalysis.
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